Africa's economic history since 1960 fits the classical Shows that low school attainment, political definition of tragedy: potential unfulfilled, with instability, poorly developed financial systems, large disastrous consequences.
Not only is Sub-Saharan Africa poor, growth has been the slowest of any region of the world. On average, real per capita GDP did not grow in Africa over the 1965-1990 period, while, in East Asia and the Pacific, per capita GDP growth was over five percent and Latin America grew at almost two percent per year. This tragedy has drawn considerable attention. In addition to numerous journal articles, 3 a stroll through the Africa section of the library reveals an abundance of books with titles such as 1 References are to Enke (1963) and Kamarck (1967) , respectively. 2 These figures are in Purchasing Power Parity adjusted terms. 3 See World Bank (1981, 1989, 1994a) , Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1993) , Collier and Gunning (1992) , Soludo (1993) , Husain and Faruquee (1994) , Pack (1993) , Lewis (1986) , Wheeler (1984) , Ndulu (1991) , Elbadawi (1992) , Elbadawi and Ndulu (1994) , Helleiner (1986) , Fosu (1992a,b,c) , Gyimah-Brempong (1991) , Killick (1991) , Berg (1993) , Pickett (1990) , Hadjimichael et al. (1994), and Rimmer (1991) . Chhibber and Fischer (1992) Faruquee, 1994) , that examine the linkages between policy reforms and economic performance over the past decade.5 These rigorous country-studies identify a diverse set of potential causes of Sub-Saharan Africa's ills ranging from bad policies, to poor education, to political instability, to inadequate infrastructure, to ethnic strife, etc. Clearly, if economists are to claim any success in explaining why some countries are rich and others poor, Africa's tragedy must be part of the explanation. Similarly, a great challenge for policy analysts is to derive policy recommendations and strategies that will ignite sustained development in Africa.
This paper uses one methodology -cross-country regressions -to examine crosscountry growth experiences, with special attention to Sub-Saharan Africa, over the last 30 years. We contribute to the literature by statistically quantifying the empirical association relationship between economic growth and a wider array of factors than any existing study. In addition to standard variables such as initial income to capture convergence effects, schooling, political stability, and indicators of monetary, fiscal, trade, exchange rate, and financial sector policies, we consider new measures of infrastructure development, cultural diversity, and economic spillovers from neighbors' growth. The analysis:
(1) improves substantially upon past attempts to account for the growth experiences of Sub-Saharan African countries, on economic reform in Sub-Saharan Africa which discusses changes in exchange rate, fiscal, financial sector, trade, educational, and regional integration policies that could potentially stimulate sustained owth in Africa. 4 The authors of these books are, in order: Blomstrom and Lundahl (1993), Borgin and Corbett (1982) , Glickman (1988) , Ravenhill (1986), Sadip Ali and Gupta (1987), Turok (1987) . 5 The former has recently been updated in Bouton, Jones, and Kiguel (1994).
(2) affirms that low school attainment, political instability, poorly developed financial systems, large black market exchange rate premia, large government deficits, and inadequate infrastructure are associated with slow growth, (3) finds that Africa's ethnic diversity tends to slow growth and reduce the likelihood of adopting good policies, and (4) identifies a strong web of geographic connections: many policies in country A are closely associated with growth in country A; policies in neighboring country B are correlated with policies in country A; and country A's growth rate is strongly correlated with neighboring country B's growth rate, even after controlling for policies in country A.
The relationship between particular policy indicators in one country and growth in its neighbors' economy suggests that there may be growth spillovers with strategic policy implications. While requiring much additional work to establish causal relationships, this paper's results are consistent with the view that improving policies alone boosts growth substantially, but if neighboring countries act together, the growth effects are much larger.
Specifically, the coefficients suggest that a policy change by a set of neighbors will have an effect on growth that is 2.2 times larger than if a single country had acted alone.
The cross-country regression methodology has numerous shortcomings and should not be the only method used to study growth or draw conclusions about Africa. 6 Crosscountry regressions do not establish the direction of causality between growth and the policy and political indicators that we study. We do not estimate structural models and the coefficients should not be interpreted as elasticities. Although we sometimes use the coefficient estimates to exemplify the strength of the association between growth and policy indicators, these examples should be interpreted as suggestive illustrations, not as exploitable elasticities. We view the cross-country regressions as examining the strength 6 For a discussion of the weaknesses with cross-country growth regressions, see Levine and Renelt (1991) and Levine and Zervos (1993). of the partial correlation between economic growth and a variety of economic and political indicators. As such, cross-country regressions offer complementary information to the rigorous country studies mentioned above by permitting a uniform statistical assessment of growth across a wide array of countries.
I.
Using Cross-Country Regressions to Explain Growth
Since we are focusing on long-run growth, we attempt to abstract from business cycle fluctuations and study economic performance over decades. Specifically, the explanatory variable in our regressions is the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s for all countries with data (excluding Gulf Oil States). Thus, each country has three observations, data permitting. We typically have 193 observations.
A. Core Regression: Description
To explain long-run growth, we begin with a "core" regression that includes a fairly standard set of right-hand-side variables and then expand this set in subsequent sections. This subsection describes why we include each "core" variable. Further, we include two variables to control for initial income (at the start of each decade) and thereby capture the convergence effect highlighted by Barro and Sala-iMartin (1992) . The economic reasons underlying this convergence effect are based on the ' The Africa dummy variable is "robust" as defined by Levine and Renelt (1992) .
assumption that -all else equal -lower income countries will enjoy a higher marginal productivity of capital. This should stimulate domestic investment by residents and foreigners that will raise the capital/labor ratio and generate output growth and higher wages. However, Baumol et al. (1992) Finally, we include three policy indicators in the core regression. We include a measure of financial development, DEPTH, which equals liquid liabilities of the financial system divided by GDP. 9 For many countries the ratio equals M2/GDP. King and Levine (1993b) show that DEPTH responds to financial sector policies in predictable ways, and King and Levine (1993a,b) show that DEPTH is closely associated with long-run growth.
Also, given the findings by numerous authors, we include a measure of the black market exchange rate premium, BLACK. Finally, we measure the fiscal stance of the country by 8 For example, we used measures of civil liberties, the number of revolutions and coups, and the number of casualties by war. Also, see Barro (1994) .
9 Liquid liabilities includes demand deposits and interest bearing liabilities of banks and nonbanks. On finance and economic development also see Collier and Mayer (1989) . The coefficients on the catch-up variables, 0.096 on INCOME and -0.007 on INCOMESQ, imply that the catch-up effect will be weaker for very poor countries and strongest for middle-income countries. Specifically, the catch-up effect is a concave function of initial income. For the given parameter values, the catch-up effect is strongest for countries with incomes of about $1,600.12 Africa's average initial per capita income is below $1,600. Thus, the regression indicates that Africa should enjoy a catch-up effect, but this effect will, on average be less pronounced for Africa because of the non-linear association between initial income and growth whereby very poor countries enjoy less of a catch-up effect than countries with incomes of around $1,600.
10 A negative relationship between government deficits and growth has earlier been found by Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995 ), Fischer (1993 ), and Easterly and Rebelo (1993 . 11 Trade or export shares are generally not significant as explanatory variables in cross-country growth studies. Helleiner (1986) has previously pointed out the lack of explanatory power of export shares for Africa specifically. A long-standing strand of the literature argues that export growth is significant (e.g. Lussier, 1993, recently) , but using export growth as a variable raises severe causality questions. 12 To compute this, take the derivative of the core regression with respect to INCOME and set this to zero: 0 = 0.0957 -(0.0067)(2)(INCOME). Thus, INCOME = 7.36, and initial real per capita GDP with the maximum catch-up effect is exp(7.36} -1,574.
The dummy variables for both Sub-Saharan African countries and Latin America and Caribbean countries are significant and negative. These two regions of the world grow significantly more slowly that predicted by the cross-country growth regressions.
However, when we do a Chow test to see whether the coefficients of the core regression are significantly different for only the sample of Sub-Saharan African countries, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there are no differences. This implies that the difficulty in accounting for the tragedy of Africa does not lie in different sensitivities to policy variables. Nonetheless, although regression's R 2 is a bit over 50 percent and the coefficients have the expected signs, we are unable to account adequately for the poor growth performance of Africa and Latin America.
C. Assessing Africa 's Performance
Using the core regression results presented in Table 1 , we now decompose Africa's performance and compare it to other regions of the world (following a similar exercise by Barro and Lee (1993b), which was also emulated for Africa by Elbadawi and Ndulu (1994) ). Table 2 gives average values of the variables in the core regression for different groups of countries. Africa had worse policy indicators than other regions of the world.
For example, financial depth in Africa is less than half of financial depth in East Asia and Pacific. Africa's black market premium is 50 percent larger than the black market premium in the rest of the developing country world, and, on average, Africa has larger government deficits than non-African countries. Furthermore, average school attainment is about 50 percent higher in other developing countries. Thus, poor policy indicators and low human capital, as measured by school attainment, link closely with growth in Africa.
One can formally decompose the core regression results by computing that part of the growth difference between Africa and other countries accounted for by each of the right-hand-side variables of the core regression. For example, consider Africa versus nonAfrican countries. Subtracting Africa's growth rate from non-African country growth rates the difference in growth rates is 2.3 percentage points. 13 By subtracting Africa's value for each explanatory variable from non-African country values and multiplying this difference by the regression coefficient, we can compute that part of the difference in growth rates between non-African countries and African countries associated with by each explanatory variable.
The decomposition results are presented in Table 3 . The core regression attributes 1.5 of the 2.3 percentage point difference in growth rates between non-African and African countries to the Africa dummy variable. All of three policy indicators (black market premium, financial depth, budget surplus) combined account for about 0.9 percentage points of the 2.3 percentage point difference. 
m. Two Other Explanations For African Growth
In this section, we attempt to account more fully for Africa's poor performance.
Although we examined the effects of institutions' 4 , wars,5 terms of trade, 16 infrastructure, and ethnic conflict, we concentrate on the links between growth and both infrastructure and ethnic conflict due to data availability. Furthermore, since data are scarce and the SURPLUS variable reduces the sample considerably, we consider the effects of incorporating indicators for infrastructure and ethnic conflict with and without the government SURPLUS variable in the core regression.
A. Infrastructure
14 Many studies of Africa cite the hostile institutional enviromment for private business as a factor in the growth outcome (see references in World Bank, 1994a). Mauro (1993) and Knack and Keefer (1994) present cross-country evidence that institutional factors affect economic growth using data from country risk services for international investors. The country risk indices measure the degree of corruption in business dealings with the government, the prevalence of bureaucratic delays, the risk of nationalization, the degree to which contracts are enforced, and the general integrity of the legal system. The data on the few African countries show that African countries are in the lower half of the sample in terms of institutional development. Zaire, Liberia, and Kenya are apparent examples of institutionally-hampered growth. Over the past 3 decades, 13 of the 20 worst military conflicts have been in Africa. However, this variable is not significant in the pooled growth regressions. This may be because the most disruptive wars interrupt data collection. We do not have complete data on 10 of the 20 worst war experiencing countries. 16 Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (1989, 1993) discuss the crucial role of response to terms of trade shocks in macroeconomic outcomes. However, Africa's terms of trade shocks were no worse than other LDC's (World Bank, 1994a), which we confirmed in our data.
Many studies of Africa cite the poor state of infrastructure. Infrastructure variables have the same rationale for inclusion in the growth regression as human capital variables: they raise the marginal product of private investment in physical capital, and thus the growth potential. An influential study by Aschauer (1988) claimed that infrastructure had large effects on US productivity growth; Canning and Fay (1993) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) have similar findings for the cross-country sample.' 7 Easterly and Rebelo used consolidated public sector investment in transport and communications; these data are available for too few African countries to be of use here. Canning and Fay (1993) present data on physical measures of infrastructure, such as kilometers of roads and railways per worker, electricity-generating capacity per worker, and telephones per worker. Table 4 17 An earlier cross-section study by Khan and Reinhart (1990) did not find strong growth effects of infrastructure, but this study used only an indirect measure of infmstruture investment. 18 Canning and Fay (1993) also found no direct effect of these two variables in their OLS panel regressions for growth with S-year averages. They did find strong effects of roads and railways on growth in a fixed effects regression, however. Fixed effects seem inappropriate here, since this paper is trying to explain the Africa fixed effect.
The data shown here may even understate the extent of the infrastructure gap between Africa and the rest of the world, as they do not correct for quality of infrastructure. For example, Chad is shown as having 15 thousand telephones, but 91 percent of all local phones calls are unsuccessful. Uganda has two thousand kilometers of paved roads, but only 10 percent of them are in good condition.' 9
Although infrastructure seems to matter, the Africa dummy remains significant in the regression including telephones. Africa grows more slowly than accounted for by the right-hand-side variables.
B. Ethnic Diversity
Wars, institutional weakness, and even bad policies may reflect a more fundamental characteristic of African societies, great ethnic diversity. High ethnic diversity may lead to increased civil strife, political instability, and destructive competitions for rents by ethnic factions. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) shows how corruption is most damaging when different groups are competing for payoffs. It may be more difficult to achieve a consensus for good policies in a polarized environment as indicated by Alesina and Drazen (1991) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , Alesina and Tabellini (1989), and Alesina and Perotti (1994) . We suspect that ethnically fragmented societies are prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different ethnic groups and have difficulty agreeing on public goods like infrastructure, education, and good policies. Furthermore, ethnic diversity may favor policies destructive to long-run growth like financial repression and overvalued exchange rates if such policies create rents for the group in power at the expense of other groups.
To examine the effects of ethnic diversity, we use a variable constructed by Mauro (1993) based on data originally collected by an institute in the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Table 32 . These data are not available for earlier years, so we cannot insert them into the regression.
The variable, ETHNIC, measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country will belong to different ethnolinguistic groups. ETIC will increase with the number of ethnolinguistic groups and will increase the more equal is the size of the groups. Canning and Fay (1993) use a related measure based on the same original data: the proportion of the population belonging to the largest ethnolinguistic group and find that growth is positively related to size of the largest ethnic group. Table 6 shows the most and the least ethnically diverse societies in the world in 1960 in Mauro's data. Fourteen out of the fifteen most ethnically diverse societies in the world are in Africa; three of the East Asian fast growers are among the most ethnically homogeneous. Table 5 regressions (3), (4), (6), and (7) present evidence on the empirical association between ethnic diversity and economic growth. ETHNIC is significantly correlated with growth, controlling for other factors. The coefficient on the ethnic diversity variable implies that it accounts for 0.8 percentage points of the 2.3 percentage point gap between Africa's growth and the rest of the sample, i.e., Africa's greater than average ethnic diversity accounts for about 35% of its growth differential with the rest of the world. While ethnic diversity is negatively associated with growth and Sub-Saharan Africa has great ethnic diversity, the Sub-Saharan Africa dummy variable tends to remain significant in the Table 5 regressions that include the ethnic diversity variable. We still cannot account for Sub-Saharan Africa's slow growth.
Importantly, the ethnic diversity variable has a high correlation with the other right-hand-side variables. Table 7 shows that ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with schooling attainment, with financial depth, and with all three infrastructure indicators: roads, telephones, and electricity. It is positively correlated with the black market premium. Quantitatively, the data imply, as noted above, that ethnic diversity independently accounts for about 35% of Africa's growth differential with the rest of the world, but when the effects of ethnic diversity on policies is also considered this figure rises to 45% of Africa's growth differential. Thus, ethnic diversity slows growth directly and retards growth indirectly by making the adoption of good policies more difficult.
IV. Troubles with the Neighbors
The frequent use in the literature of a dummy variable for Africa indicates that the poor growth performance of Africa is usually thought to be a fixed effect (e.g. Barro, 1991) . What is striking in the data is the regional concentration of both failure (in Afiica) and success (in East Asia), as well as the variation across decades (Africa had done bettter in the 1960s; Latin America had a synchronized crisis in the 1980s).20 Recently, an insightful pair of papers has suggested that there are general spillovers across borders from unfavorable characteristics of one's neighbors, like low investment or high political instability, to one's own growth performance (Chua, 1993, Ades and Chua, 1993) . These authors report that the Africa dummy variable becomes statistically insignificant when controlling for spillovers from one's neighbors.
A. Estimating Neighbor Spillovers
This paper extends the work of these papers in two ways. First, we change the Chua (1993) definition of neighbor effects by weighing each neighbor by the size of its total GDP, as opposed to Chua's equal weights. It seems plausible that Mexico would be affected more by the US than by Belize, and Cameroon would be affected more by gigantic Nigeria than by tiny Equatorial Guinea. 21 Second, instead of putting the averages of the neighbors' right-hand side variables into the growth regression, we put the average 20 It is easy to forget that a number of African countries were considered success stories well into the 1970s (Cote d'Ivoire and Kenya, for example). In fact, in every decade, there were some African countries with respectable per capita growth rates --even in the disastrous 1980s, 3 African countries grew in excess of 3 percent per capita. But few African countries sustained healthy growth over time, hence the low average growth for the continent. 2 1 We explore furnher different weighting schemes for spillover effects from other countries. We find that weighting by distance (which was unsuccessful in an earlier paper by De Long and Summers, 1992) performs poorly in identifying country spillover effects. of the neighbors' growth rate itself into the regression. This allows us to test for direct contagion effects of growth successes and failures. Because there is simultaneity in this case --you affect your neighbor and your neighbor affects you back --we instrument for the neighbors' growth rate with the neighbors' regressors from the core regression. We will then perform a test of the overidentifying restrictions that the neighbors' right-handside variables have no direct effect on growth (i.e. other than through the growth contagion channel), which will allow us to test our contagion hypothesis against the policy spillovers hypothesis. We also test whether a country A's neighbors policies, educational attainment, initial income, and political stability independently affect A's growth after controlling for its neighbors growth rates. A test of the overidentifying restrictions that all of the neighbors' right-hand side variables have zero direct effect on the country's own growth rate once its neighbors' growth is considered fails to reject this set of restrictions. The test statistic is TR 2 where T is the number of observations and the R 2 is from the regression of the residuals in the regression shown in Table 8 on the set of all exogenous variables, 22 With SURPLUS and the neighbor's growth rate both included in the core regression, the Africa dummy remains insignificant, but P-value on the neighbors' growth rate falls to 0.06 and the coefficient is reduced to 0.34. Including SURPLUS eliminates much of the data from the 1960s. Since the covariation of neighbors across time helps distinguish the neighbor variable from the Africa dummy, we suspect that elimination of the 1 960s is responsible for the weaker significance of the neighbor variable in this regression.
including the neighbors' right-hand side variables. The test statistic, which is distributed as X2 with 5 degrees of freedom (six excluded exogenous variables --the neighbors' right-hand-side variables --minus one included endogenous variable), has a value of 8.35
and is not significant at the 5 percent level in the regression excluding the government surplus. In the regression including SURPLUS, the test statistic has 6 degrees of freedom and has a value of 10.65, still not significant at the 5 percent level. Thus, the data do not reject our econometric specification of using two-stage least squares with the neighbors weighted average growth rate.
B. Where Do Neighbor Spillovers Come From?
Unfortunately, we can only speculate about where neighbor spillovers come from.
For example, if adapting a technology to a local environment is risky and involves fixed costs, then a direct foreign investor who has had success in one country may find it easier and more attractive to move next door to a neighboring country. Thus, success in one country could spillover to neighboring countries. In addition to potentially lowering the risk and cost of foreign investment, neighbor success may have demonstration effects.
Governments that attain high growth with a given set of policies provide a valuable model of the efficacy of such policies to the government and citizenry of neighboring countries. 23 We have empirically examined one channel. International trade does not appear to be a very plausible mechanism for spillovers. African countries do not trade much with each other. Moreover, when we construct a spillover variable using trade weights, the international trade spillover variable performs very poorly.
What about the transmission of growth failures across borders? Governments do not necessarily maximize growth; they may maximize rent-seeking opportunities. Even policies that are bad for growth could be imitated by neighbors if they are demonstrated to be good for creating rent-seeking opportunities or some other non-growth objective that is desired by policy-making elites.
We find that our observable policy indicators and the other right-hand side variables from Table 8 are indeed highly correlated across neighbors (Table 9 ). This gives a hint that unobservable government or private sector behavior contained in the residual may be correlated as well.
We acknowledge that the replacement of the Africa dummy by a growth spillover effect really only changes the kind of mystery. More research is needed to go inside the black box. Our results suggest that research on growth interactions between countries would be another fruitful area to add to the study of countries' individual characteristics.
C. Neighbor Multipliers
The implications of a growth contagion effect are very different from an Africa dummny effect. If we presume a particular causal direction for illustrative purposes, the contagion effect says that Africa's lagging growth relative to policy variables will disappear if a critical mass of countries improve their policies. The Africa dummy effect said that Africa's growth would always be worse for a given set of policies. The good news about the contagion effect -if one assumes that causality runs from policies to growth -is that the negative contagion effect of the last 30 years could be changed to a positive contagion effect in the next 30 years: a large policy change in unison would have a multiplier effect on the countries in the region that is even larger than the strong, direct effect of a country's policies on its own growth rate.
If a country reforms alone, there will be a small spillover to its neighbor's growth rate, which in turn spills back over into the country's own growth rate. Given that most countries have 4 or more neighbors, these spillover effects are fairly small as shown in the Appendix. From our estimates, the median country changing policies in isolation has a neighbor multiplier of 1.041; that is, the total effect of one's policies on one's own growth rate taking into account neighbor feedback is only 4 percent larger than the direct effect of one's own policies on one's own growth.
However, if all countries act together, the neighbor multiplier is much larger. This is because all of the home country's neighbors are acting together to increase their own growth, which increases the home country's growth by a large amount in addition to the direct effect of the home country's policy change. If we suppose that policy changes are identical for a closed set of neighbors, the multiplier will be [l/(I-b)I, or 2.2 where b is the estimated coefficient on one's weighted average of neighbor growth rates, estimated by us at .55. That is, a set of neighbors adopting a set of policy changes that would have raised growth by 1.04 percentage points if they had each acted alone will see growth increase by 2.2 percentage points if they act together. This also works in the other direction: with a set of neighbors all simultaneously adopting bad policies like exchange rate controls leading to a high black market premium, the negative effect on all of them would be magnified.
It is important to emphasize that our results do not imply that countries would be better off free-riding on their neighbors' good policies rather than making their own policy changes. The typical free rider problem arises because one's own actions have only a negligible effect on the benefit one obtains; here, one's own policies stili have a stronger effect on one's own growth than they do on the neighbor's growth. Nor is there any incentive to wait for the other country to move first, since with our additive specification the marginal growth benefit of changes in one's own policies is the same regardless of whether the neighbors have good or bad policies. These results do suggest that acting in unison has magnified effects for good or evil.
V. Conclusions
This paper sheds additional light on accounting for long-run growth across all countries with a particular emphasis on understanding Africa's growth tragedy. In short, we find that poor growth is strongly associated with (1) low schooling, (2) political instability, (3) under-developed financial systems, (4) distorted foreign exchange market, as measured by the black market premium, (5) high government deficits, (6) low infrastructure, (7) 
Appendix: Calculating policy multipliers with spillovers of growth to neighbors
Section IV of the paper presents evidence that a country's own growth is influenced by a weighted average of its neighbors' growth rates. We present in this appendix the algebraic implications of these spillovers for magnifying the effects of policy changes.
For a given time period, we can write the system of equations determining crosscountry growth rates for n countries as follows:
where G is an n x I vector of growth rates for the n countries over the given time period, P is an n x q matrix of country policies and other characteristics, A is a q x I vector of coefficients on policies, b is a scalar measuring the degree of spillover from one's neighbors to one's own growth, W is an n x n matrix of weights on one's neighbors to calculate the weighted average of their growth rates. The rows of W sum to unity; the diagonal elements of W are zero. Recall that the weights in W were calculated using the total GDP of neighboring countries. where P is an n x q matrix with identical rows, made up of changes in the q types of policies, A is the same n x I vector of coefficients on policies as before, and i is the n x I unit vector. Then the change in growth rates (given as the n x I vector G) as a result of the policy changes in unison is given by:
We can see from A.4 that the neighbor multiplier for a policy change in unison is given simply by taking the row totals of the (I-bW)-' matrix. Given that the row totals of W are all equal to one, it is easy to show that the row totals of (I-bW)-' are all equal to 1/(1-b), which is the second equality in (A.4) . Hence, the multiplier with an estimated b coefficient of .55 is 2.2. In other words, a policy change in unison that would have had the direct effect of raising growth in each country by I percentage point will raise it by more than twice that much when all neighbors act together. Canning and Fay (1993) Note: ETHNIC measures probability that two randomly selected persons from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. The more groups there are, higher the ETHNIC. The more equally distributed the groups, the higher ETHNIC.
Source: Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (1972) .
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